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COMMENT/The World Ocean: A Plan for
International Action

Over two-thirds of the earth's surface is occupied by the ocean. For centuries
Man, the land-dweller, has turned to the seas as a source of food, means of
trade and communication, defense against invasion, and medium for sport and
recreation. But for all his use of it, Man's knowledge of the nature of the ocean
remained meager, and his activity was concentrated on or within a few feet of
the surface. With the voyage of the research ship H.M.S. Challenger in 187276, however, the study of the sea assumed a three-dimensional aspect, and a
new science-oceanography-was born. Due in part to technological advances
occasioned by World War II, oceanography has gained a new momentum.
Optimistic observers are now depicting the seas, especially the seabed and subsoil, as an almost limitless source of food and minerals-the answer to problems posed by a constantly increasing world population.
Present commercial development is focused on realizing the vast fishing
potential of the oceans and moving into deeper and deeper water with offshore
oil wells. But research and planning are being conducted in many new areas of
oceanographic interest. The National Council on Marine Resources and
Engineering Development recently awarded contracts for studies ranging from
the potential of aquaculture for providing food from the sea to the observation
of the ocean from spacecraft.' The aspect of oceanography that has stimulated
the most interest among economists, social planners, and industrial developers
is the possibility of exploiting the resources of the seabed and subsoil of the
oceans. Prospecting for minerals on the sea floor in exposed ocean areas is a
recent development, but already it is predicted that the next "glamour industry"
will be ocean based.2 One commentator foresees deep ocean technology developing in such a fashion that "we may expect a significant proliferation of nonmilitary submersibles and low-cost equipment capable of operating throughout
the water column at or on the bottom and capable of exploiting the seabed or
' 3
the resources of the seabed.
As with all of Man's activities, a body of law has developed around his
involvement with the sea. From the early Rhodian laws to the Treaty of Torde1. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT,
MARINE SCIENCE AFFAIRs-A YEAR OF PLANS AND PROGRESS, App. D, at 190 (1968).

2. Klima & Wolfe, The oceans: unexploited opportunities, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr., 1968, at 140.
3. Craven, The Challenge of Ocean Technology to the Law of the Sea, 22 JAG J. 31,
36 (1967).
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sillas4 through the seventeenth century debate between Mare Liberum and
Mare Clausum,5 nations have attempted to formulate principles and devise
codes through which their use of the seas could be justified. As national interests in the use of the seas change, so does the body of law which governs
oceanic activity. It has been said that "[p]olicy, like technology, will not stand
still."' 6 With the movement from the surface to the depths of the sea, old laws
must be modified and new agreements reached.
President Johnson and the Eighty-ninth Congress recognized the need for
planning in the area of ocean development and took a significant step in that
direction by passing the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act
of 1966. 7 This Act established the National Council on Marine Resources and
Engineering Development, chaired by the Vice-President and composed of
cabinet-level officers, to plan a coordinated federal program in marine science
development. A Presidential Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and
Resources was also created to recommend a national oceanographic program
adequate to achieve the goals stated in the parent legislation. To achieve this
purpose, the Commission was divided into panels, with the International Panel,
headed by Carl A. Auerbach, the most directly concerned with recommending
a new legal framework for future ocean development.8
In its report, 9 the Commission proposed a comprehensive national program
for marine development and a specific international legal regime to govern the
exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources underlying the high seas.
The recommended legal regime is based on a redefinition of the "legal" continental shelf, the creation of an "intermediate zone" between the continental
shelf and the deeper ocean areas, and the establishment of a registry authority
4. Signed June 7, 1494 by Spain and Portugal to settle claims arising from Columbus's first voyage. This treaty purported to divide the world's oceans along a meridian
located 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands.
5. To justify its seizing a Portugese vessel, the Dutch East India Company retained
Hugo Grotius to prepare a legal case. Grotius produced a treatise called De lure
Praedae, one chapter of which was published in 1609 as Mare Liberum. Grotius
maintained that the ocean was free to all nations. "[T]he English disagreed, and, thus,
began the battle of the books. William Welwood attempted to rebut Grotius' assertions
in his Abridgement of All the Sea Laws, published in 1612. Grotius presented a counter
rebuttal. The English then retained another great scholar, John Selden, to rebut Grotius'
counter rebuttal. The product of Selden's work was entitled Mare Clausum, which was
completed in 1617 or 1618, but not published until 1635." Stang, The Walls Beneath
the Sea, UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, March 1968, at 36.
6. Popper, The Deep Ocean Environment: U.S. and International Policy, 59 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 171 (Aug. 12, 1968).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. III, 1965-67).
8. See letter from Julius A. Stratton, Chairman of the Commission on Marine Science,
Engineering, and Resources, to Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Int'l
Organizations and Movements, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, November 15, 1967
(H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 212 (1967)).
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to record claims and, in a limited fashion, to oversee the orderly development
of ocean mineral resources. Concurrently, the Commission recommended creation of an International Fund to be administered within the context of the
proposed legal framework. This Comment will analyze the Commission's proposed legal regime in relation to the legal history of the seabed and the projections of future objectives and needs in undersea development.
The Development of the Continental Shelf Concept
The first legal step into ocean space was the 1942 treaty between the United
Kingdom and Venezuela which allocated jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil of the Gulf of Paria. 10 Such bilateral action was of little interest to other
states since the area, which lay between Trinidad and the coast of Venezuela,
was substantially circumscribed by the parties to the treaty. Although the term
"continental shelf" was not used in the treaty, it is believed that this was the
first appearance in state practice of that now familiar geo/legal concept. 1'
A more significant step toward a legal regime for sub-surface ocean areas
resulted, however, not from bilateral or multilateral accord, but rather from a
unilateral declaration. On September 28, 1945, President Harry S Truman
proclaimed that "the Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the
United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control."' 2 The Truman Proclamation became the keystone for undersea legal development in the following
decade. A study was begun in 1951 by the International Law Commission of
the United Nations to determine the present state of the law of the sea and to
project what it should be in the future. This study culminated in the 1958
13
Geneva Conference which codified the law of the sea into four conventions,
10. Treaty Relating to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria, Feb. 26, 1942,
[1942] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 10 (CMD. 6400), 205 L.N.T.S. 121.
11. Kutner, Habeas Marinus: Due Process of Inner Space-A Proposal, 22 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 629, 640 (1968).
12. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, September 28, 1945,
10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945). Although the proclamation did not itself define the area

involved, a press release accompanying the proclamation indicated that the claim
being made by the United States was only to the geologic continental shelf. The press

release stated that, "[g]enerally, submerged land which is contiguous to the continent
and which is covered by no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is considered as
the continental shelf." 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 484 (1945).
13. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958,
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High
Seas, April 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11;
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April
29, 1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on
the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
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including the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Mirroring United States'
policy as expressed in the Truman Proclamation, this convention, which became
effective in 1964 upon ratification by 22 nations, affirmed the coastal states'
4
exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of their shelves.'
Effect of 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea
Before discussing the problem of establishing a legal regime for the deep ocean
seabed seaward of the continental shelf (or recognizing the legal principles
which may already appertain), the present legal status of the various segments
of the sea as codified by the 1958 Conference should be outlined (see Figure
1).
Closest to the land there exist internal waters, e.g., bays, inlets and harbors,
which represent that part of the sea landward of the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured. These waters have the same legal status as the land
territory of the state.13 The next belt of waters is the territorial sea. The sovereignty of the coastal state extends to this area, including the seabed, the subsoil,
and the airspace above the waters. 16 The only legal difference between territorial sea and internal waters is the right of innocent passage guaranteed to
17
ships of all states through the former.
Despite agreements reached in the 1958 Conference, a significant bar to
international cooperation in the use of the seas remains because the participants
were unable to agree on the breadth of the territorial sea. A second conference
was called specifically to deal with the breadth of this area and the establishment of fishing zones in the high seas beyond the limits of the territorial sea. At
this second conference, held in 1960, a joint United States-Canadian compromise proposal calling for the establishment of a six mile limit to the terri8
torial sea with a contiguous six mile fishing zone failed to pass by one vote.'
This important question remains unsettled, and as of December 1, 1968, there
were at least 48 states claiming a territorial sea between three and six miles wide
while another 48 claimed a width between nine and 200 miles, 38 of this latter
group asserting a 12 mile jurisdiction. 19 The United States continues to claim a
14. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, art. 2, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
15. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, arts.
1, 5, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
16. Id. art. 2.
17. Id. art. 14.
18. Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for
Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751, 776, 782 (1960).

19. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT,
MARINE SCIENCE AFFAIRs-A YEAR OF BROADENED PARTICIPATION, App. C-4, at 248-51
(1969) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES].
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three-mile territorial sea. 20 Little hope is seen for any general agreement on the
breadth of territorial waters while the "cold war" persists.2 1
Seaward from and adjacent to the territorial sea and extending 12 miles
from the baseline there is a zone of the high seas known as the "contiguous
zone." Here the coastal state may exercise such control as is necessary to prevent
or punish "infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea." 22 Because of the specific 12 mile limit
fixed for the contiguous zone, this concept has meaning only for those states
which claim a territorial sea less than 12 miles wide.
Those waters not included within the territorial sea or internal waters of a
state are high seas. The 1958 Geneva Conference specifically provided in the
Convention on the High Seas that, "[t]he high seas being open to all nations,
'23
no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty."
This principle of freedom is modified, to some extent, by the provisions relating
to the exercise of authority in the contiguous zone and by the direction that this
freedom "shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests
24
of other States in the exercise of the freedom of the high seas."
By outlining a legal regime for the continental shelf areas, the 1958 Conference, to a limited degree, considered the sea bottom as well as the surface
and water column. The regime enacted applies "to the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial
sea [the seabed of the territorial sea is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal
state by virtue of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone], to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the
said areas."'25 This open-ended definition was the result of an attempt to delimit
in legal terms the boundaries of the geologic continental shelf, the actual limits

20. "Since no compromise on the territorial sea limit was reached at the Conference,
the United States . . . will continue to adhere to the long-established and currently
recognized territorial sea of 3 miles." Dean, supra note 18, at 788. However, the United
States subsequently extended its jurisdiction over the fishery resources of the sea in a
zone extending nine miles beyond the three mile territorial sea. (16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94
(Supp. III, 1968) ). While the legality of this extension of jurisdiction depends on customary law developed through the practice of states rather than on any express provision of the 1958 Geneva Conventions, it approximates the result which the U.S.-Canadian

compromise proposal would have achieved.
21. D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 9 (1967).
22. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art.
24, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
23. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 2, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
24. Ibid.
25. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, art. 1, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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of which vary considerably from area to area. 26 Its interpretation has been the
subject of continuing debate since the 1958 convention. In view of the uncertainty evidenced by this debate, the Commission has recommended that the
exploitability test be replaced by a specific distance standard, i.e., 50 nautical
miles from the baseline, while retaining the alternative 200 meter depth test.27
Thus, as a result of the 1958 Conference, the jurisdictional divisions of the
world's surface waters, viz. high seas, territorial seas and, internal waters, include within them all of the oceans. There is no area of the sea which is not
defined by one of these terms and therefore all are subject to a defined legal
regime. The same is not presently true, however, for the ocean bottom unless
one interprets the exploitability test of the Convention on the Continental Shelf
as extending coastal state jurisdiction to a mid-ocean median line.28 The seabed
and subsoil of the high seas seaward of the continental shelf have not been the
subject of international agreement. Some international planners believe that
some form of international legal regime for the deep ocean seabed must be
29
established soon.
But, others see the harnessing of sea resources to be years away and would
defer establishment of a deep ocean legal regime until more is known of the
30
technological and economic specifics of exploitation of the sea bottom. Still
others see an effective legal regime developing only from specific disputes
allowing adverse parties to advance theories which will evolve through the

26. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA, Geographic Bulletin No. 3
(1965), at 7:
On the average the continental shelf extends seaward for about 30 miles.
But the average width is not very meaningful because of the great variation to

be found from place to place. Along the west coast of South America, for example, where mountains rise sharply from the coast, the submarine surface in

turn plunges to great depths with very little trace of a ledge which could be
construed as a continental shelf. At the opposite extreme, the entire Bering
Strait area, extending 800 miles north of the north coast of Siberia, is less than

100 fathoms in depth. At other places, also, the width of the shelf is measured
in hundreds of miles, including the Atlantic Ocean off the southern coast of

Argentina and the South China Sea off the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula. The Persian Gulf, some 600 miles long by 230 miles wide is nowhere
deeper than 50 fathoms. Its seabed qualifies in its entirety as continental
shelf.
27.

COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 9, at 145.

28. See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.
29. See, e.g., Wilkey, The Deep Ocean: Its Potential Mineral Resources and Problems, 3 INT'L LAW. 31, 37 (1968); Statement of Ambassador Arvid Pardo in H.R. REP.
No. 999, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 267 (App. 9) (1967).
30. See letter from Allan Shivers, President of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, September 14, 1967 (Hearings on S.J.
Res. 111, S. Res. 172 and S. Res. 186 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]).
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adjudicative process into a stable legal structure. 31 "Premature" has thus become a key word with those who oppose immediate movement toward international agreement in ocean space. Critics of this attitude include Eugene
Brooks who has characterized these objections as "conclusory generalizations
not always accompanied by factual explanation, [which] have a tendency to
ring down the curtain on analytical debate. '32 Furthermore, the report of the
Commission's International Panel notes that: "unless a new framework is
devised, some venturesome governments and private entrepreneurs will act in
accordance with one or the other of the undesirable alternatives possible under
the uncertain status quo and in time create faits accomplis that would be difficult to change, even though they adversely affected the interests of the United
33
States and the international community.
Present and Future Scientific Activity Under the Seas
One reason that the "conclusory generalizations" which Mr. Brooks criticizes
are not "accompanied by factual explanation" is that the facts tend to belie the
assertion of prematurity. On the ocean bottom there is a frontier which has
been characterized as "potentially more active than outer space, where homesteaders are moving farther out and deeper every year." 3 4 Already the Department of the Interior has granted oil and gas exploration and exploitation leases
in depths up to 1500 feet as far as 32 miles from the coast.35 Technology is
expanding worldwide to meet the challenge of deep ocean exploitation. On
August 2, 1968, a French oil company successfully installed a prototype offshore production platform on a test location in the Bay of Biscay "to determine
feasibility of using larger units of its type to drill and produce wells in water
depths as great as 1,000 feet." 36 The technology of ocean mining is also being
developed, and although some suggest that the prospect of deep ocean mining
is remote, the Chief Scientist of the Naval Material Command's Deep Submergence Systems Projects Office contends that "low-cost vehicles capable of

31. Letter from Thomas A. Clingan, Jr. to Sen. Claiborne Pell, December 5, 1967
(id. at 63).
32. Brooks, International Organization for Hydrospace, paper submitted for Law of

the Sea Third Annual Summer Conference, University of Rhode Island, June 24-27,
1968, at 25.
33. COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL VIII-24 (Preprint ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as REPORT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL].
34. Cheever, The Role of International Organization in Ocean Development,
INT'L ORGANIZATION

22

629, 640 (1968).

35. H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1967).
36. Cotterlaz-Rennaz & Vilain, Unique Production Platform at Work off France,
WORLD OIL, December 1968, at 68.
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exploitation are technologically feasible and will be realized within the next 2
37
decades."
From these deep sea submersibles, the next step in the efficient exploitation of
the seabed will be to fix stations on or in the sea floor. Experiments along this
line have already been carried out in depths as great as 600 feet, and it is contended that the technology now exists to extend the construction of such stations
to any depth; "only the motivation and money are lacking." 38 One of the most
startling developments in the advance to the deep ocean is the introduction of
men as free swimmers in previously prohibitive depths by the technique known
as "saturation diving." 39 This capability is the basis for the prediction that "by
1975 there will be colonies of aquanauts living and working on the ocean floor
at depths in the neighborhood of 1,500 feet."'40 In one of the more enthusiastic
projections of future ocean resource exploitation, an outline of a "possible or
hypothesized national program in oceanography" predicts construction of a
manned laboratory at 1,000 feet by 1970, the establishment of manned habitation at 6,000 feet in 1972, the mining of the ocean floor in 1975, and the occupation of the mid-Atlantic ridge by 1980. 41 Substantial support for these
predictions can now be found in the Commission's Report. In its recommendations for establishing a national capability in the sea, the Commission urges
development of the competence necessary to occupy the bed and subsoil of the
United States' territorial sea, utilization of the continental shelf and slope to a
depth of 2,000 feet and, as a long-range goal, "achievement of the capability
to explore the ocean depths to 20,000 feet within a decade and to utilize the
'
ocean depths to 20,000 feet by the year 2000." 42

Development is being delayed, however, by the absence of national and/or

37. Craven, supra note 3, at 35.
38. Fye, Maxwell, Emery and Ketchum, Ocean Science and Marine Resources,
USES OF THE SEAS 17, 28 (E. Gullion ed. 1968).

39. This technique involves compressing the diver in an artificial atmosphere, usually a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen, and helium, within a chamber, until the ambient pressure reaches a level equal to the pressure of the
water at the depth at which the diver is to operate and then maintaining the
diver at the pressure for 48 hours, the time required for the dissolved gases in
the diver's body fluids and tissues to reach an equilibrium.
The physiological feasibility of ...long-term human habitation on the ocean
bottom was established by the Navy's SEALAB II experiment .... Three teams
of 10 men spent 15 consecutive days on the ocean bottom at the depth of 200
feet.
Craven, supra note 3, at 36.

40. Pardo, Who Will Control the Seabed? 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1968 at 126.
41. Klima & Wolfe, The Oceans: Organizing for Action, HARv. Bus. REV., May-

June 1968, Exhibit II, at 104.
42. COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 9, at 32.
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international legal framework in which progress could take place. 43 "As things
stand now," reports the Harvard Business Review, "private corporations are
not motivated by clear goals or market opportunities. Indeed, businessmen
explain that it is risky, even hazardous, for their companies to attempt to set
common goals under our current laws. It is this fact, together with other circumstances, which makes it so necessary to get the overall government planning
process started . . . . 44 The work being done under the mandate of the Marine
Resources and Engineering Development Act, especially the Commission's
Report, is a significant start in the area of government planning and should
begin to relieve the uncertainty hindering undersea development.
The United Nations is also engaged in planning for future undersea development. The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction"
met last year to discuss many of the same questions which were considered by
the President's Commission. The U.N. Committee was established in response
to the submission by the Maltese delegation of a proposed declaration and
treaty regarding the reservation of the seabed for peaceful uses.46 This committee met throughout 1968 and divided its tasks between an Economic and
Technical Working Group and a Legal Working Group, each writing separate
reports. It had been hoped that as a result of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee the Twenty-third General Assembly of the United Nations would be in a
position "to establish a Committee on the Oceans with a broad mandate to
develop law and to promote international cooperation with respect to the ocean
and ocean floor." 47 However, the major recommendation of the Committee,
whose combined report was submitted late in 1968,48 was the establishment of a
permanent committee to carry on the unfinished work begun during the past
year.4 9 Although the Legal Working Group did not arrive at a definitive recommendation ("Owing to the limited time at its disposal and the complexity of the
problems before it, the Legal Working Group was not in a position ... to com43. Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 641
(1968). "Further developments are now perhaps as dependent on favorable economic
and legal conditions as on improvements in physical capabilities." Id.
44. Klima & Wolfe, supra note 41, at 102.
45.
Established by the U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1967. G.A. Res.
2340 (XXII), reproduced in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES, supra note

19, App. C-1, at 233.
46. U.N. Doc. A/6695, August 18, 1967, reproduced in H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 7R (1967).
47. Goldberg, U.N. Establishes Ad Hoc Committee to Study Use of Ocean Floor, 58
DEP'T STATE BULL. 125 (Jan. 22, 1968).
48. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION, U.N.
Doc. A/7230 (1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE].

49. G.A. Res. 2467A (XXIII) (1968) reproduced in NATIONAL
MARINE RESOURCES, supra note 19, App. C-I, at 234.
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plete its programme of work." 50 ), a valuable interchange of ideas took place
during the Group's meetings.
United States Ocean Policy
As in the development of all new programs, the terms of the legal system finally
adopted for the seabed will be determined by the goals established by the
framers. Perhaps the most oft-quoted statement of United States policy regarding ocean development is that which President Johnson made upon the commissioning of the survey ship Oceanographer on July 13, 1966: "[U]nder no
circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and
mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands
under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms
are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings." 51 The intention of United
States policy makers to eschew a chauvinistic attitude in the development of
ocean resources has been repeatedly emphasized:
[A]s the great majority of states view the situation, the resources of
the deep seabed are in a real sense a legacy of mankind. Such resources should not, in their opinion, be appropriated or exploited by
those nations rich or fortunate enough to be able to operate in the
ocean depths-at least, not unless the stake of other nations in this
great reservoir is recognized. The question confronting us and others
in the United Nations is to determine whether we can jointly work out
ways in which these resources, when science and technology make
them available, can be equitably utilized in the interest of all concerned .... The task of the next few years is to produce that broad
current of agreement which will enable Americans to play their part
with people from many other states in an orderly, harmonious, and
beneficial
effort to utilize ocean floor resources in the interest of man52
kind.
The objectives of United States policy as expressed by President Johnson and
the State Department are threefold: (1) establishment of a legal regime broadly
acceptable to all the nations of the world; (2) avoidance of conflicts among
nations exploiting seabed resources; and (3) encouragement of development
and use of the deep ocean floor.53 These objectives were first reduced to concrete
50.

REPORT OF THE AD

Hoc

COMMITTEE,

supra note 48, at 50.

51. Johnson, Effective Use of the Sea, 2

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL

DOCUMENTS 930, 931 (July 18, 1966).

52. Popper, supra note 6, at 173, 177.
53. These objectives were first reduced to concrete proposals which included the
following:
1. No State may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any
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proposals in a draft resolution submitted to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on June 28, 1968.
The President's Commission voiced its support for these principles, 54 while
setting forth the specific objectives toward which its proposed legal framework
is directed. First, a workable legal regime for the seabed must encourage the
necessary technological effort and capital investment by making it possible to
carry on exploration and exploitation activities in an orderly and economic
manner. Secondly, such a regime must give all nations a "fair chance" to
participate in the development of undersea resources. Thirdly, the system
adopted must be one which will create a minimum of vested interests in order
that future changes in the framework will not be inhibited. Lastly, and perhaps
most importantly, it must "seek to avoid and not to provoke international conflict." 55
Proposed Alternative Regimes for the Seabed

The various regimes for the seabed proposed in recent years should be reviewed to establish the context in which the Commission's Report must be
appraised.
In considering alternative legal regimes for the deep sea floor, one of the
earliest questions to arise was whether the legal status of resources was already
resolved by virtue of the law relating to the continental shelf. An influential
proponent of this theory, Shigeru Oda of Japan, believes that because of the
exploitability clause in the definition of the continental shelf, "all the sub-

part of the deep ocean floor. There shall be no discrimination in the availability of the deep ocean floor for exploration and use by all States and their
nationals in accordance with international law;
2. There shall be established, as soon as practicable, internationally agreed
arrangements governing the exploitation of resources of the deep ocean floor.
These arrangements shall reflect the other principles contained in this Statement of Principles concerning the Deep Ocean Floor and shall include provision for:
(a) the orderly development of resources of the deep ocean floor in a manner reflecting the interest of the international community in the development
of these resources;
(b) conditions conducive to the making of investments necessary for the
exploration and exploitation of resources of the deep ocean floor;
(c) dedication as feasible and practicable of a portion of the value of the
resources recovered from the deep ocean floor to international community
purposes; and
(d) accommodation among the commercial and other uses of the deep
ocean floor and marine environment.
United States of America: draft resolution containing statement of principles concerning the deep ocean floor, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/25 (June 28, 1968).
54.

Co~MMssIoN's REPORT, supra note 9, at 155. See also REPORT OF THE INTER-

NATIONAL PANEL, supra note 33, at VIII-30, 31.
55. CoMMIssIoN's REPORT, supra note 9, at 141-42.
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marine areas of the world have been theoretically divided among the coastal
states at the deepest trenches. '5 6 This view is noted by most commentators, but
few take it seriously. A typical reaction is that of Luis Kutner who, while proposing his own solution to the problem of public order in ocean space, commented: "[A]s it becomes possible to exploit the sea-bed at increasingly greater
depths, exploitation may occur in mid-ocean, hundreds and perhaps thousands
of miles from the coast. A literal reading of article 1 [of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf] would enable the coastal state from which base lines were
drawn to claim such areas. But the background of the Convention indicates an
intent to limit claims only to the shallower areas of the ocean reasonably adjacent to the coast." 57 The U.S. State Department holds a similar view. David
H. Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs, stated in an address before the Symposium on Mineral Resources of
the World Ocean that:
The open-ended nature of this outer limit seemed rather academic in
1958 when the convention was concluded. It is highly pertinent today.
... Quite apart from the fact that only 37 nations have ratified the
convention, the farther exploitation goes beyond the mentioned 200meter isobath, the more weight must be given to the concept of adjacency to the coast. I would not wish to hazard an opinion as to
where adjacency ends, but respectable legal authorities have stated
it
that it cannot be deemed to extend to the point where, in midocean,
58
touches the corresponding extension from the opposite shore.
Perhaps the international debate over this theory has ended now that the
U.N. Ad Hoc Committee has submitted its report. The Legal Working Group
thought it was "obvious" that the continental shelf did not extend to mid-ocean,
but because of the controversy felt constrained to point out that "none of the
members in the Working Group had suggested that either international law or
article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention authorizes the extension of limits
for an indefinite distance into the deep ocean floor and this was considered
59
possibly a valuable finding."
Assuming that the deep sea bottom is not controlled by the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, there are a variety of legal regimes which could be applied.
However, we do not start with a clean slate. Man's long experience with
the sea still remains pertinent. 60 Many commentators who emphasize the legal
56. Oda, Proposalsfor Revising the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 7 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L

L. 1, 9 (1968).

57. Kutner, supra note 11, at 647.
58. Popper, supra note 6, at 172.
59. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE, supra note 48, at 48.
60. Young, supra note 43, at 642: "Any legal regime .. .must . . .be framed with
due regard for established principles in the law of the sea: the accepted practices of
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history of the oceans suggest that the res communis regime of the high seas
could be extended to the seabed so that its resources would be acquired in the
same legal manner as fish are acquired from the sea, i.e., by reduction to
possession. Such a proposal would apply by analogy the expedient devised to
insure respect for the rights of others in the cooperative use of the high seas,
viz, the nationality of ships. Res Communis requires that a ship, as a prerequisite to its right to sail on the high seas, be registered in some state. The
state then assumes jurisdiction over the ship and its crew to insure their compliance with the international law of the sea. 61 As a proposed legal regime for
the seabed, this suggestion has become known as the "flag-nation approach."
Although this regime might profitably be invoked prior to the establishment of
a new legal framework for the ocean floor, its usefulness as a basis for a permanent legal system is subject to several significant objections. One goal of the
new regime will be the economical exploitation of the seabed. Some security,
therefore, must be guaranteed to those who invest their industrial capacity in
undersea mining. Exclusivity, a vital feature of mining law on land, will be
just as necessary for undersea mineral development. The principle of res communis prohibits the exercise of sovereignty over the submarine area where
resources are found. The flag state, then, could not guarantee to its industrialists
the exclusivity of claim which they need. "The lack of this, combined with the
necessity of committing vast sums to mining ventures years in advance of commercial return, can be anticipated ultimately to deter both exploration and
'6
development of mineral resources.' 2
Richard Young has summarized other points concerning the flag-nation
approach as follows:
On the credit side, the extension of the flag state's legal system to a
deep-sea operation would be a relatively quick and easy way to provide a developed legal framework, administrative machinery, and the
security of tenure [although not the exclusivity of claim] necessary
for the success of the enterprise .... On the debit side, the approach
would favor the few countries possessing the technology and capital

centuries may require modification, but it would be neither practicable nor desirable
to dismiss them as no longer relevant. Unlike outer space, ocean space is not a tabula
rasa, and its legal history cannot be ignored."
The international agreement on the use of outer space has been suggested as a possible model for ocean space. There is a difference, however, in both an historical and
economic sense. As Senator Pell noted: "[fln outer space there are no nice manganese
nodules to be plucked by the spacemen as they wander around. There are no immediate
economic incentives to move in those directions." Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 26.
61. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, arts. 5, 10, 12, 24, and 27, [1962]
13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
62. Wilkey, The Deep Ocean: Its Potential Mineral Resources and Problems, 3
INT'L LAw. 31, 34 (1968).
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required for such undertakings, to the exclusion of most nations, and
thus might be subject to charges of "neo-colonialism," unjust advantage, and the like. It might also give rise to international conflict over
the richer sites, and might63encourage "gold-rush" tactics and uneconomic exploitation activities.
It has been suggested by some commentators, notably Professors McDougal
and Burke, 64 that efficient exploitation of sea resources can, nevertheless, be
maintained under a res communis regime. This assertion is based on the view
that exclusive exploitation rights would not be necessary because of the "vastness and the immense riches of the oceans." At first blush the vastness of the
ocean might suggest that initially interaction between exploiters and competition for deep sea resources would be minimal. "It is the nature of man, however, to congregate competitively at the site of another's success. .

.

. It may

therefore be anticipated that the identification of an important mineral resource
in the deep ocean or the known location of an object of interest... will result in
congregation of competing entities. '' 66 Therefore, even if one accepted the premise of marine resource inexhaustibility, 67 there would still exist a need for
exclusivity to attract entrepreneurs to the deep sea, a need which the flag-nation
approach, without additional qualifications, could not satisfy.
Another approach to the legal structuring of ocean space which would require a minimum of international rules is that based on the view of the seabed
as a res nullius-the property of no one, subject to appropriation by anyone.
Many commentators see this principle as the basis of the law now appertaining
to the seabed. 68 The application of a res nullius regime to the ocean bottom is
63. Young, supra note 43, at 647.
64. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS, viii (1962).
65. Ibid.
66. Craven, The Challenge of Ocean Technology to the Law of the Sea, 22 JAG

J. 31, 35 (1967).
67. This premise has been shown to be invalid with regard to the most common resource of the sea-fish. "[E]ach stock of fish is capable of being overfished, to the
detriment of all. In numerous instances, unregulated fishing effort has had this effect.
Accordingly, to preserve stocks to the benefit of all, fishing effort on any species must
be regulated so that it will not exceed that level corresponding to the maximum sustainable yield." Chapman, Who Owns the Sea? in H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
159 (1967).

68. One spokesman has pointed out that:
[i]n contrast to some opinion, there is no legal void, there is no real uncertainty as to the rules which apply in the deep ocean. The public order of the
oceans has been long established. In a nutshell, the high seas water surface
and column) belong to everyone and are therefore subject to appropriation by
no one; the resources of the high seas and the sea bottom beyond the legal
continental shelf belong to no one and are therefore subject to taking by anyone; the activities of persons and nations pursuant to these rules must be respected by everyone.
Wilkey, supra note 62, at 34.
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an analogy to the legal status of unclaimed land territory, but the validity of this
analogy in the different environment of ocean space is open to question. It
should be noted at this point that the terms "res nullius" and "res communis"
have been used to such an extent in literature concerning possible regimes for
the deep ocean areas that they have lost much of their meaning. The International Panel of the President's Commission noted this fact in its report and
concluded that "the inferences one draws from either res nullius or res cornmunis are likely to depend upon the results one prefers. Nor need these results
be the same for all resources or uses of the oceans. For example, the fact that
fish are a mobile and replenishable resource and minerals are immobile and
exhaustible may lead to a view of either res nullius, or res communis which is
different for the one resource than for the other." 69 In this respect it is possible
to support the flag-nation approach on either theory, but since it is generally
accepted that the notion of occupation must be a part of any approach based
on the res nullius theory, this Comment will assume that the flag-nation approach is more closely aligned with the philosophy of res communis.
The res nullius approach suffers from many of the same defects as does the
flag-nation approach, e.g., nonexclusivity and unacceptability to lesser developed nations. It would be difficult to devise practical standards by which
the type and extent of occupation needed to legitimize a claim to exclusive
authority over a resource area could be measured. 70 As in the flag-nation approach, if one were to consider only United States' interests, the application of
res nullius to the seabed would probably be acceptable because of the technical
superiority of U.S. industry. Only the technologically advanced nations would
be able to lay claim to the resources of the sea in this manner; the lack of such
technical competence in lesser developed nations would permanently exclude
such countries from participation in deep sea exploitation, "for presumably as
their technology and financial resources would increase, so too would those of
the advanced nations, thus leaving the backward states with only the 'left-overs'
for their occupation and claim."' 71 A regime based on the principle of res nul69.

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL,

supra note 33, at VIII-21.

70. "[N]o laborious demonstration is required to show the difficulty of devising
standards by which to measure the nature and degree of occupation necessary to validate a claim to exclusive authority. . . . Can 'occupation' be effected from a dredging
barge, or a ship, or one of the hybrid types of drilling rig which are becoming increasingly common? If it can, how much area should such a project be allowed to preempt, and by what objective criteria is this to be ascertained? And how are conflicting
claims to be avoided if substantial stretches of sea bottom are subjected to an occupation based on a dredge or a rig established at one site only?" Young, supra note 43, at

646.
71.

Robertson, A Legal Regime for the Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil of the

Deep Sea: A Brewing Problem for International Lawmakers, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REV., October 1968, at 78.
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lius, then, would not satisfy the stated objectives of United States' policy in this
area.
Both the res nullius and flag-nation regimes are thus unacceptable to the
many developing nations of the world. In a pre-United Nations world where
international law was developed more by the will of dominant powers than by
a consensus of members in the international community, either one of these
positions might have been implemented. But such is not today's world and
more and more commentators view a truly international regime as the only
viable solution to the administration of ocean space. A prime mover in the
development of such an international regime is Arvid Pardo, Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations. Ambassador Pardo has concluded:
[T]here can be no doubt that an effective international r6 gime over
the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national
jurisdiction is the only alternative by which we can hope to avoid the
escalating tensions that will be inevitable if the present situation is allowed to continue. It is the only alternative by which we can hope to
escape the immense hazards of a permanent impairment of the marine
environment. It is, finally, the only alternative that gives assurance
ocean floor will be exthat the immense resources on and under the
72
ploited with harm to none and benefit to all.
If this international approach is accepted, certain questions must be asked, e.g.,
What form of international authority should have cognizance of the seabed?
How much decision-making power will it have? What should be the reach of
the international organization as to the subject matter over which it will. have
control? Should it govern all aspects of the use of the seas or only some?
Which?
Several proposals have been advanced purporting to answer these questions.
On the one extreme is the proposition that the United Nations or another
international organization should be granted full title to the seabed and complete autonomy in administration of its resources. There seems to be too much
opposition to this idea in both the United States and other countries, however,
for it to be considered as an appropriate solution at the present time. 73 Even if
objections to such a large step in the direction of supranationalism were not so
intense, there would remain practical barriers to acceptance of this regime.
72. Statement of Ambassador Arvid Pardo in H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 267, 284-85 (App. 9) (1967).
73. Both the House and Senate reports concerning this question contain many
expressions by public and private individuals and organizations objecting to the proposal to vest title to the seabed in the United Nations. See Senate Hearings, supra note
30, passim. H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1967). Many of the arguments made in these reports are summarized in Stang, The Walls Beneath the Sea,
UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PRoc., March 1968, at 40-43.
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Daniel Cheever, a Research Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, finds that present international organization is too weak to
manage the sea directly and, further, that it is unlikely that international
organization will be stronger in the water than it presently is on land. 74 Even
conceding these points, "premature control of more than half the globe by an
international body, exercising ownership and holding title, is as likely to create
controversy as it is to avoid it. It is as likely to be economically inefficient as
efficient. ' "7S Mr. Cheever also sees the chauvinistic attitudes of the various world
nations as barring such a development: "There is no short-run prospect of
establishing the world political authority necessary for the political decisions
(policy choices) that would in anything like equal terms benefit rich and poor
76
nations or coastal and noncoastal nations."
On the other end of the spectrum of internationalization is the organization
with sharply defined and very limited authority. One observer has suggested
that "[s]uch an international organization should not have any discretion in
granting or refusing rights . . . .[and] [u]nder no circumstances should the
exploration and development of the deep ocean be subject to control by inter77
national political administrative bodies."
Between these extremes are many variations on the theme of a regulatory
agency. Senator Claiborne Pell's proposed treaty for ocean space, 78 the recommended treaty published by the United Nations Committee of the World
Peace Through Law Center, 79 and the regime proposed by L.F.E. Goldie 80 all
recommend some form of international registry agency as the basis of public
order on the sea floor. Since a registry authority is also the essence of the Commission's recommendation, the remainder of the discussion will center on the
Commission's proposals, with references to other suggested regimes as appropriate.
Report of the PresidentialCommission on Marine Science, Engineering
and Resources
The Commission did not attempt to devise a unified framework to govern all
the uses of the seas but rather recommended separate consideration of the prob-

74. Cheever, supra note 34, at 648.
75. Id. at 648.
76. Ibid.

77. Wilkey, supra note 62, at 45-46.
78. S. REs. 263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
79. Proposed Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed (Aaron
L. Danzig, Chairman of the Drafting Committee (1968).
80. Goldie, The Contents of Davy Jones's [sic] Locker-A Proposed Regime for
the Seabed and Subsoil, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1967).
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lems involved in mineral exploitation and those involved in fishery development. While the Commission recommends merely improving and extending
existing agreements in the area of fisheries, it urges the United States to take the
initiative in proposing a new international framework for the development of
deep sea mineral resources. 81 The Commission's recommendations for this
international regime can be considered generally under three headings: (1)
Jurisdictional Divisions, (2) International Registry Authority and (3) International Fund.
JurisdictionalDivisions
Essential to any comprehensive legal framework for the seabed is redefinition
of the continental shelf to avoid uncertainty occasioned by the exploitability
clause. There is a divergence of views as to the proper limit for the redefined
shelf. The available options include maintaining a narrow zone defined with
reference to the 200 meter depth used in the Convention on the Continental
Shelf, recognizing a wide zone defined by the interface between the continental
slope and the deep ocean basins which is usually found at an average depth of
2500 meters (see Figure 1), or adopting a compromise definition combining a
narrow zone with a transitional area.
The Commission has chosen the third alternative by recommending the shelf
be redefined so that its seaward limit is fixed at the 200 meter isobath or,
alternatively at the discretion of the coastal state, at 50 nautical miles from the
baseline.8 2 Seaward of this redefined continental shelf the Commission proposes
an intermediate zone extending to the 2500 meter isobath or 100 nautical miles,
83
whichever alternative gives the coastal state the greater area. The character of
the intermediate zone will be such that the regime of the deep sea area will
apply, thus preventing the assertion by the coastal state of any sovereign rights
in the zone. However, only the coastal state or its licensees will be authorized to
84
explore or exploit the mineral resources in this transitional area. This concept
of a "buffer zone" had been originally advanced by Louis Henkin, Hamilton
8S
Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University,
86
whose ideas have left a major imprint on the work of the International Panel.
81. COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 9, at 14-15.
82. Id. at 145.
83. Id. at 151.
84. Ibid.
85. See Remarks of Louis Henkin, Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, April 26, 1968, in PROC. OF THE AM. Soc'Y oF INT'L
LAw 243, 244 (1968); Henkin, Changing Law for the Changing Seas, UsEs OF THE
SEAS 69, 88-89 (E. Gullion ed. 1968).
86. In its consideration of the question "Should the United States Seek to Create a
New Framework?" the International Panel draws heavily on the work of Professor
Henkin as expressed in HENKIN, LAw FOR THE SEA'S MINERAL RESOURCES (A Report
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The Commission proposed this regime in the face of strong argument favoring a wide zone. The American Branch of the International Law Association
(American Branch) and the National Petroleum Council (NPC) have concluded that the present definition of the shelf, with its "exploitability" and
"adjacency" language, should be interpreted to give the coastal state a wide
zone in which it may exert sovereign rights, a zone extending to the base of the
continental slope at 2500 meters.8 7 If it is desirable to eliminate the uncertainty
in the language of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the American
Branch and the NPC suggest that the states concerned, by ex parte declarations,
signify their intent to recognize the 2500 meter interpretation. Professor Henkin
dissented from the position of the American Branch, saying "[in my view, its
focus is narrow, its concerns parochial, and its proposals short-sighted." 88 The
position of the American Branch and the NPC is recognized in both the Report
of the International Panel and the Report of the Commission, but, adopting
the view of Professor Henkin, the Commission rejects the position as "contrary
to the best interests of the United States." 8 9 The International Panel assigns four
reasons for rejecting the concept of a wide zone: (1) the international community would regard such a position as a "grab" of the seas' resources; (2)
such a proposal is "unfair" to non-coastal states and those states unendowed
with shelves rich in mineral resources; (3) other coastal states would benefit
proportionately more than would the United States; and (4) such an extension
of sovereign rights seaward of a narrow zone would induce other nations to
extend their authority throughout the water column as well as on the seabed,
thereby creating vast areas of territorial sea. 90
The validity of the first two reasons is, at the present time, conjectural. The
third and fourth objections are more substantive and require some analysis.
Using estimates derived by the United States Geological Survey, the International Panel notes that the extension of the coastal state's sovereignty to the
2500 meter depth would add 479,000 square statute miles of seabed to the
850,000 square statute miles of area contained within the 200 meter isobath

Prepared for the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development,
published as ISHA Monograph No. 1 by the Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs of Columbia University

3
PANEL, supra note 33, at VIII-15 n. 8.
87.

(1968)).

See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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along the coasts of the United States. 91 However, "[o]ther coastal States of the
world would ... gain proportionately more than the United States ....-92 This
proportional gain of other nations under the American Branch's and NPC's
proposal is more conceptual than real. The coastal state will have, as a minimum, the same area off its coast available for exploitation whether the Commission's Intermediate Zone concept is adopted or the regime of the Convention on the Continental Shelf is extended to 2500 meters. Due to the alternative
100 mile limit in the Commission's recommendation, it is possible for a coastal
state to have a larger exploitable area under the Intermediate Zone concept. It
might be suggested that by extending the continental shelf regime the coastal
state will realize an economic gain unavailable under international administration because of the fees and royalties attaching to exploitation in the Intermediate Zone. An objection based on this suggestion appears chimerical, however, when it is pointed out that most of the commentaries, including the report
of the American Branch, see no significant obstacle in the concept of allocating
royalties for international purposes, even from exploitation in the area defined
93
by the Commission as the Intermediate Zone.
The remaining difference between these regimes is the concept of sovereign
rights. When sovereign rights are extended to greater distances on the seabed,
there is the danger (as the Panel notes in its fourth objection) that some states
may seek to extend their authority throughout the water column, and perhaps
to the airspace above. In his dissenting statement to the American Branch Interim Report, Louis Henkin noted that the waters above the extended seabed
"would tend to become territorial sea." 94 Such a tendency to encroach upon the
95
traditional freedom of the seas has always been opposed by the United States.
William T. Burke and Northcutt Ely, Rapporteur and Chairman, respectively,
of the American Branch, commenting on Professor Henkin's fear of further
expansion of coastal sovereignty to the superjacent waters similar to the action
taken by Ecuador, Peru and Chile, claim that "[h]istory does not support this
assertion. The claims of the Latin American countries ... antedate the [1958]

91. Ibid.
92.

Id.

at
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19 (1969).
93. See text accompanying notes 134-46 infra.
94. AMERICAN BRANCH REPORT, supra note 87, at XXI (dissenting statement).
95. Speaking at the Naval War College in July, 1968, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research and Development expressed the concern of the Navy that:
[p]roposed seabed regimes might eventually result in claims and restrictions on
the use of the superjacent waters and secondly might lead to information and
reporting requirements that would pose unnecessary problems for military
operations. While the Navy is free to operate on the high seas, and while it

generally has the right of innocent passage through foreign territorial waters, it
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Convention. '96 While it is true that these claims were made six years prior to
the codification of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the International
Panel's Report suggests that these claims were consequences of the Truman
Proclamation of 1945, 97 a unilateral declaration not too much different from the
"ex parte declarations" which the American Branch and the NPC suggest.98
One might be inclined to dismiss the extension of sovereignty throughout the
water column by Ecuador, Chile, Peru and, now, Argentina99 as peculiar to
those South American countries and a danger with which we need not be concerned in other areas of the world. Such is not the case. The Soviet Union has
recently adopted an edict on the continental shelf'00 and in connection with an
analysis of this action Mr. William Butler has observed that many Soviet
jurists consider that
all natural processes taking place in sea waters interact with processes
occurring in submarine areas of the sea. "Physical and biological
phenomena occurring in waters superjacent to the continental shelf
may not be correctly understood and analyzed without simultaneously
researching these phenomena on the seabed." Hence, "oceanographic
research is connected with the seabed; i.e., the continental shelf." Presumably on the basis of this reasoning the Soviet Union may believe
itself justified in requiring that consent be given before oceanographic

must gain the consent of the coastal state if it wishes to operate in foreign
territorial waters.
Address by Robert A. Frosch, Symposium on Mineral Resources of the World Ocean.
July 12, 1968, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV., October 1968, at 59. Arthur H. Dean, the
Chairman of the United States Delegation to the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences
on the Law of the Sea, has pointed out the dangers inherent in the extension of territorial seas past a narrow zone:
As every island has its own surrounding territorial sea, extensions of the territorial sea limit to 12 miles all over the world would enclose a large number of
existing high seas areas as well as restrict the use of a number of international
straits. Furthermore, the territorial seas of neutral nations, if extended to 12
miles, could offer a safe haven from which enemy submarines might operate
submerged and undetected by the coastal state, although in violation of international law.
Thus, aircraft and naval movements with or without air cover would be
seriously restricted, if not made impossible.
Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of
the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751, 756 (1960). See also Dean, The Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 612 (1958);
Dean, Achievements at the Law of the Sea Conference, PRoc. OF THE AM. Soc'y OF
INT'L L. 186, 192 (1959).
96.

AMERICAN BRANCH REPORT, supra note 87, at XXII.

97. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL, supra note 33, at VIII-22 to 23.
98. AMERICAN BRANCH REPORT, supra note 87, at XII; NPC REPORT, supra note 87,
at 6.
99. Argentine Law No. 17.094 of December 29, 1966, 6 INT'L LEOAL MATERIALS
663 (1967).
100. 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 392 (1968).
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research is conducted in waters superjacent to its continental shelf beyond territorial limits .... 101
It is just such an abrogation of the traditional freedom of the seas to which the
United States has been and remains opposed.
This last objection, then-the fear of extension of sovereignty over larger
areas of the high seas-is the most crucial. The Commission's recommendation
seems based on a more comprehensive view of our national interest than does
that of the American Branch or the NPC. The Intermediate Zone concept
avoids the hazard involved in extending sovereign rights while achieving much
the same economic result, thus safeguarding the national interest both in our
coastal waters and throughout the world.
InternationalRegistry Authority
The governing body for the regime developed by the President's Commission
will be an International Registry Authority.102 All claims to explore or exploit
mineral resources in a particular area will be registered with this authority on a
first-come, first-registered basis. The Authority will have no discretion in registering exploration or exploitation claims except that it may satisfy itself as to the
technical and financial competence of the applicant prior to such registration.
Initially, the registration of "a claim to exploit particular mineral resources in a particular area of the deep seas should confer upon the registering
nation the exclusive right to engage in or authorize such exploration."' 10 3 Upon
proof of discovery, the claim to explore would be converted into a registered
claim to exploit. The size of the area covered and the duration of the claim
would be determined by the Authority. The Commission's Report further
provides that upon "expiration of the period of registration of a claim to explore or to exploit, further exploration or exploitation of the resources covered
by the claim should be subject to whatever international legal-political frame10 4
work is in effect at that time."
The Commission has thus chosen to establish an independent regulatory
agency with quite limited jurisdiction and discretion. This international agency
approach has been recommended by other theorists as the best short-run
method for meeting current objectives in deep sea mineral development,10 S and
101. Comment, The Soviet Union and the ContinentalShelf, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 103,
105-06 (1969).
102. COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 9, at 147-49.
103. Id. at 148.
104. Id. at 149.
105.
It is possible . . . that the oceans, the air space above them, and
their subsoils, if weather and minerals are taken into account, can be exploited best to meet human needs in the short run by national programs regu-
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it has the approval of those interests which desire that the resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction be used as a common good in
the interest of mankind. 106 Such a recommendation is a common feature of
several other proposed draft treaties and other less formal suggestions for a
legal system governing the deep sea, but among these plans are some notable
differences.
Senator Pell's proposed treaty would create a licensing authority designated
by the United Nations in accordance with procedures as outlined in the U.N.
Charter. 10 7 The Ocean Agency proposed by the World Peace Through Law
Center would be established independently of the United Nations but brought
into a "relationship" with it by agreement. 08s Francis T. Christy has suggested
that administration of an international regime be conducted under the direction of the United Nations because that body is extant and functioning, thus
avoiding the problem of setting up a new administration, and because he
believes the United Nations can be used advantageously for this purpose. 109
Christy also recognizes, however, that United Nations administration is not a
sine qua non and that "[s]ome other international body might work just as
0
well.""l
The Commission avoids the wholesale involvement with the United Nations
that Senator Pell and Mr. Christy contemplate, and at the same time defines

fated by international treaties prescribing not only the rights and duties of
member governments but also assigning harmonizing roles to international institutions . . . Short-run moves in this direction, rather than toward the premature granting of title over the high seas or ocean bottom beyond national
limits either to the United Nations or to national governments, would preserve
important options for the long run. What is needed now is a dependable treaty
regime to facilitate the use of ocean resources by licensing and regulating
exploitations and by settling disputes.

Cheever, The Role of International Organization in Ocean Development, 22
ORGANIZATION

INT'L

629, 642 (1968).

106. See id. at 645-47; Address by Ambassador Arvid Pardo, in PROC. OF THE AM.
Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 216, 227 (1968).
107. Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 4.
108. Proposed Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed, supra

note 79, at 18.
109. Christy, Alternative Regime for the Minerals of the Sea Floor, H.R. REP. No.

999, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 241 (1967).
110. Ibid. Christy clarified his position concerning U.N. administration in a later
article by saying:
The authority need not operate under the aegis of the United Nations. Obviously, the United Nations does not have, at present, an agency that is equipped
to deal with such an authority, nor does the UN have the expertise required for
management. These problems do not, however, preclude the establishment of
such an authority within the UN structure. If the agency is so established, it
would be clearly desirable for the authority to have a high degree of autonomy
(similar, perhaps, to that of the World Bank), so that it might operate without
pressure from the General Assembly.
Christy, A Social Scientist Writes on Economic Criteria for Rules Governing Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals, 2 INT'L LAW. 224, 240 (1968).
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the relationship which their proposed agency should establish with the United
Nations. While the membership and manner of choosing the governing body of
the Authority would be negotiated and set out in agreements embodying the
new framework, the Commission envisions a structure that would "find its
place in the family of the United Nations but should be as autonomous as the
World Bank.""' Although the principle of working through and with the
United Nations in order to develop it into a more valuable organization is a
laudable goal, the Commission's approach takes practical notice of the difficulties involved in direct United Nations administration." 2
Acceptance of a regime by a majority of nations is the basis for the guarantee
of exclusive rights on the sea floor without which there would be no incentive
for sizeable investments in the deep sea. In recognition of this, the Commission
has proposed that the Authority be organized "on a 'multiple principle' representation, based on the technological capacity of its members as well as on their
geographic distribution." 11 3 Such an organization should prove as acceptable
in this application as it has in the establishment of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). The "multiple principle" of
representation has been used for over two decades in the administration of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund "where authority is derived
from the alignment of voting power with economic power sufficiently to elicit
the grudging acceptance of rich and poor alike." 114 Since the World Bank's
statute frees it from "the sacred cow of 'one state, one vote' . . . the United
States has sufficient confidence in [it] to acquiesce in its conducting operational
111. COMMsSSlON' REPORT, supra note 9, at 149.
112. Daniel S. Cheever, recognizing these difficulties, has noted that "[t]he United
Nations and its agencies are as much cockpits of conflict as they are instruments of
cooperation." Cheever, supra note 105, at 639.
In a more detailed fashion, Arvid Pardo has outlined the major difficulties in United
Nations administration of the ocean floor:
[T]he United Nations does not have the power to give credible assurance
that the ocean floor will in fact be used for peaceful purposes, since action in
the Security Council can be blocked by a veto; a viable regime for the ocean
floor must be acceptable to all significant coastal states, but mainland China
and other states are not members of the United Nations and could be expected
to object to a regime administered by an organization in which they do not
participate; powerful, technologically advanced countries, such as the United
States and the Soviet Union, whose acquiescence is essential for the viability of any legal regime established for the ocean floor, would be unlikely to
give their consent to vast areas in which they have vital interests being administered by an organization in which they possess a voting power no greater
than that of very small countries, such as mine. Finally the United Nations
does not possess the required expertise for management nor is its decisionmaking process such as to give reasonable assurance that the ocean floor,
the last frontier of mankind on earth, will be administered in an orderly and
efficient manner.
Pardo, supra note 106, at 225.
113. COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 9, at 149.
114. Cheever, supra note 105, at 641.
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activities. With its weighted vote and its friends among the industrial nations
the United States can influence if not control the Bank's operations." ' s
It is anticipated that this distribution of representation within the International Registry Authority will elicit the acceptance, hopefully more than
"grudging," by enough nations to make this a viable organization. The U.N.
representative of the small but influential island of Malta has expressed his
country's recognition that "the realities of advanced technology, financial
capability, and of power require . . . due weight," and has stated that Malta

"would not oppose the concept that a small number of maritime states having
outstanding technological and financial capability should receive majority representation on the board, so long as it is also accepted that all states, whether
landlocked or coastal, should have a voice in it."1i6
In order to have a workable administrative structure, it is necessary that the
proposed international regime be not only politically acceptable to a large
number of nations, but also economically enticing to all technically competent
entrepreneurs. Among others concerned with a favorable economic atmosphere,
Melvin Conant, a representative of the Government Relations Department of
Standard Oil of New Jersey, in an enlightening speech given at the Law of the
Sea Institute in 1968, explained the importance of a "predictable institutional
environment" to potential investment. Predictable institutional environment is
one of many elements used by oil companies in determining the risk-cost factor
versus the potential gain. The internal political stability of a government as well
as its relations with and ability to defend against encroachments by neighboring
states are important factors to be considered by entrepreneurs before investing
millions of dollars in an already speculative business. By careful drafting of the
International Registry Authority's statute, this regime should be able to provide
not only a "predictable institutional environment" but also a standardized
institutional environment throughout the world's deep sea areas.
In contrast to Senator Pell's Sea Guardli 7 and the Tribunal proposed by
World Peace Through Law Center, 11s the Commission recommends the Registry Authority be granted enforcement powers limited to the right of inspection
onlyii 9 and that activities conducted under registered claims be governed by the
115. Id. at 643.
116. Pardo, supra note 106, at 228.
117.
118.

Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 7.
Proposed Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed, supra

note 79, at 19.
119. "[B]ecause we recommend that the Authority be empowered to cancel a
registered claim if the registering nation fails to discharge its obligations properly, the
Authority must have the means to perform this function fairly and with full knowledge
of the facts. Accordingly, the Authority should be empowered to inspect all stations,
installations . . . and to conduct appropriate hearings."

note 9, at 150.

COMMISSION's

REPORT, supra
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civil and criminal laws of the registering state.' 20 Christy's regime would also
provide for "some inspection scheme to ensure that the rights of the lease are
not being abused .... ,u2 In suggesting this inspection requirement, Christy
notes that such a requirement does not differ substantially "from those relating
to the exploitation of oil resources on the U.S. continental shelf. The only
difference is that administration is in the hands of an international body rather
than the U.S. federal government."' 122 The limited policing functions accorded
the Registry Authority would be conducted, as would all its functions, under
the direction of the weighted vote of the governing board. The limitations on
the policing functions of the Authority recommended by the Commission is
another indication of the Commission's desire to restrict the supranational
aspects of such a body.
The limited authority of the Commission's proposed regime can be contrasted with the regime envisioned by Ambassador Pardo of Malta. He and his
government "conceive the authority as being endowed with a general competence over the marine environment as a whole, and a specific wider competence over the seabed and ocean floor."' 123 More specifically, Ambassador
Pardo sees the authority assuming responsibility "for the majority of existing
international programs concerning the oceans and the marine environment
and the living resources thereof now conducted by half a dozen United Nations
agencies and would coordinate such other international activities in this field as
it might be found useful to leave within the competence of specialized international institutions."' 24 Such a wholesale transition to a new, comprehensive
system is, at present, impractical. The Commission's position of developing new
administrative structures only in new areas and expanding on past developments in areas such as fisheries regulation1 2 5 is less cumbersome and meets the
needs of the day without complicating the possibility of acceptance by including
unnecessary innovations.
The Commission has chosen a "first-come, first-registered" procedure for
allocating rights under its proposed regime. It could have chosen any of several
other ways, the most significant of which is allocation on the basis of the highest
bid. This latter means would insure that the most efficient producers were
awarded the rights to explore and exploit the deep sea, but it is subject to the
criticism that the poorer nations would be permanently barred from participation in underseas development. However, smaller nations would not have
much better hopes under a first-come system when they would still have to
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Ibid.
Christy, supra note 109, at 242.
Ibid.
Pardo, supra note 106, at 227.
Ibid.

125.

CoMMIssioN's REPORT,

supra note 9, at 104.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XVIII

satisfy the Registry Authority as to their technical and financial competence.
F. T. Christy has noted that the first-come approach "provides no method for
choosing among claimants for the same or overlapping areas. And in addition,
it is likely to stimulate a headlong race among nations." 126 Since the exploiters
will be required to pay a fee in any case, Mr. Christy sees an auction as the
"most rational and least arbitrary" means for allocating claims. 127 Such would
be the case if the value of the claims or the right to explore could be ascertained
beforehand, this is unlikely, however, since so little is known at the present time
concerning the economics of deep sea exploitation. With no basis for determining the value of a claim, bidding would be uneducated and haphazard. In
view of this situation, the first-come, first-registered approach seems to best
satisfy present realities, especially in the area of providing incentives to move
into the deep sea.
In developing nearby continental shelf areas, the United States has established a policy framework to govern offshore exploration and exploitation
which seems to satisfy national needs while encouraging such activities on the
part of individual entrepreneurs. Such being the case, it has been observed that
"[n]ational policy is a base point for our approach to international action in
this area." 128 Perhaps in tacit recognition of this viewpoint, the Commission has
recommended that only a state or an association of states will be eligible to
register a claim on behalf of a business entity. 129 Such a provision makes the
Commission's recommendation, like the similarly operating Pell proposal,
"predominately national, with certain transnational overtones." 130 The Ocean
Agency created by the World Peace Through Law Compact would be a more
supranational body than the Registry Authority because it would exercise its
authority directly on the individuals and private entities applying for licenses,
rather than through the applicant's state. 131 Christy's proposed regime would
apparently operate in the same manner. Such supranational proposals, it is
submitted, tend to move in the direction of world government without recognizing the practicalities of present-day commercial operations. "A more conservative ... arrangement would recognize that, for the present, decision centers for

resource allocation and management are in national capitals. It would also
recognize that in market economies industrial and food-processing firms could

126. Remarks of F. T. Christy, Jr.,

PROC. OF THE AM. Soc'v oF INT'L L. 240 (1968).
127. Ibid.
128. Popper, The Deep Ocean Environment: U.S. and International Policy, 59
DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1968).

129.

COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 9, at 148.

130. Brooks, International Organization for Hydrospace, paper submitted for Law of
the Sea Third Annual Summer Conference, University of Rhode Island, at 20 (1968).

131. Proposed Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed, supra
note 79, at 20.
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be encouraged by national authorities to develop the oceans in a way that might
132
be unlikely for the time being with ... international jurisdiction."'
The InternationalFund

Another potentially controversial aspect of the Commission's recommended
regime is the notion of the International Fund. Recommending a first-come,
first-registered doctrine for the proposed regime might doom the whole plan to
failure for the same reasons that the occupation and flag-state approaches are
unacceptable, viz., the underdeveloped countries would not approve such a
regime because they would be frozen out of participation therein. The intermediate zone concept takes the initial sting out of the proposal by guaranteeing
a large area for the exclusive exploitation of the coastal state. But what of the
underdeveloped non-coastal states133 and those with minimal coast lines? These
states are includible in the plan for development of the seas' resources by means
of the International Fund. Each state registering a claim with the International
Registry Authority would pay a fee to cover the costs of the system and in addition will be required to pay a portion of the value of production in any exploited area into an International Fund. 134 The Commission's Report states that
these royalties would be "expended for such purposes as financing marine
scientific activity and resources exploration and development, particularly foodfrom-the-sea programs, and aiding the developing countries through the World
Bank U.N. Development Program and other international development agen.
13
cies." 5
The Commission's purpose in formulating the International Fund is clearly
an attempt to gain international approval and acceptance of its legal regime
through financial compensation. The Report states: "The Commission's proposals for an International Fund do not constitute just another way for the
rich nations to aid the poor nations. They are intended to compensate the common owners of the mineral resources of the deep seas by using the 'economic
rent' for purposes that the international community agrees will promote the
common welfare."' 136 Senator Pell's proposed treaty was silent on the question of
revenues 137 but other commentators see no significant objection to the concept of
132. Cheever, supra note 105, at 648.
133. See H.R. REP.No. 999, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1967).
134. COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 9, at 149.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.

137. But see the statement of Clark Eichelberger before the Foreign Relations Com-

mittee of the Senate: "Accompanying the licensing feature of which Senator Pell spoke,
there should be a revenue plan which I hope he will incorporate in his treaty. The fees
from the licensing feature might be used to strengthen the U.N., and particularly to be
used in a development fund for the developing peoples." Senate Hearings, supra note 30,
at 43. See also, Remarks of the Honorable Claiborne Pell in PRoc. OF THE AM. Soc'y
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allocating certain royalty payments for international purposes.1 38 Disagreement
arises when the details of amount, administration, and disposition of revenues
are considered. While outlining revenue disposition under a possible United
Nations ocean regime, Seymour S. Bernfeld observed that "[e]ven if the
United Nations Secretariat were to be allowed to retain only enough to pay the
cost of administering the system or even the costs of the UN itself, the ensuing
cacophony among the family of nations over the division of spoils would put to
shame the heavenly philosophical chaos caused among Anatole France's
1 39
saints and angels [when forced to consider] the effect of baptism on birds."
Louis Henkin views payment of deep-ocean royalties to the United Nations
more pragmatically. He finds it unlikely that the nations of the world "will
agree to give to the United Nations amounts that would make it largely independent of member contributions. Some countries, notably the United States
which bears the major burden of financing the United Nations, recognize that
such burden also makes the United Nations dependent on them and gives them
corresponding power and authority in the Organization. They would be unwilling to give to majorities the means to go off on what they consider frolics,
or worse."140 The Commission has recognized the validity of these observations
and has concluded that "[t]he proceeds from these payments should not be
41
expended for general purposes of the United Nations."
In his discussion of possible alternative regimes for the deep sea, F.T.
Christy, noted that an international authority, composed of a board weighted
in favor of the exploiting nations, could effectively regulate ocean exploitation; however, "[tlhe revenues above the costs of administration should be
turned over to another agency for distribution ....
[T]he function of management should be separated from the function of revenue distribution." 142 Several
considerations support such a dichotomy of functions. While a registry board

INT'L L. 237 (1968): "Thus my treaty seeks to steer a middle course, assuring on the
one hand adequate protection and return for the developers and, on the other hand, an
international regime which may regulate exploitation and receive whatever benefits may
be determined to accrue to the international community, whether these be in the form
of license fees or royalties, or the proceeds of auction .... "
138. See Christy, supra note 109, at 242; AMERICAN BRANCH REPORT, supra note 87,
at XII; Henkin, Changing Law for the Changing Seas, USES OF THE SEAS 69, 88-89
(E. Gullion ed. 1968); Wilkey, The Deep Ocean: Its Potential Mineral Resources and
Problems, 3 INT'L LAW. 31, 34 (1968) ; Cheever, The Role of International Organization

in Ocean Development, 22 INT'L ORGANIZATION 629, 642 (1968); PRoc. OF THE AM.

Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 228 (remarks of Arvid Pardo), 235 (remarks of Richard Young), 249
(remarks of Northcutt Ely) (1968).
139. Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea--Security of Investment, 2
INT'L LAW. 67, 74 (1967).

140. Henkin, supra note 138, at 92-93.
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formed on the "multiple principle" of representation is necessary to guarantee
the major exploiters that their interests in deep sea resources allocation and
administration will be safeguarded, no such weighted influence should be
necessary in the area of revenue distribution. The many small nations of the
world which would hope to benefit from these revenues might demand an
equal voice in their application. 143 Also, a board assembled on the basis of
technical expertise in resource management cannot be expected to be equally
adept in the intricacies of financial administration. Lastly, since the Registry
Authority will be required to set the royalty rates, 144 such a combination of functions might impose a conflict of interest on it. If charged with the distribution
of revenues for community-approved purposes, the Authority might assess the
needs of its planned programs and charge royalties sufficient to fill out its
budget. On the other hand, being responsible for the efficient and economical
exploitation of ocean resources, the Authority, in order to encourage exploitation, might be required to charge minimal royalties which would produce small
sums for distribution.
It can be expected that coastal states which do not plan exploitation programs of their own in the near future will be amenable to the proposed regime
because of their indirect reception of royalties through the International Fund
and their direct reception of royalties from foreign entrepreneurs who wish to
exploit that country's Intermediate Zone. In the Intermediate Zone the exploiter
will be required to pay the normal royalty to the International Fund. In addition, it can be expected that the coastal nation would not consent to register a
claim on behalf on an entrepreneur without demanding some consideration for
the service, probably an additional royalty. It is submitted that such a combination of royalties, varying from country to country, could lead to inefficient and
uneconomical exploitation in these zones. Adjacent countries, having similar
exploitable resources, might have to dicker with a foreign exploiter to the
extent that the revenue returned to the state would be minimal. A country having an exclusive mineral deposit might charge an excessive royalty, thereby
precluding efficient exploitation. A suggestion by Mr. Christy seems a better
solution to the problem of providing adequate compensation to coastal coun143. The demand for an equal voice in the distribution of these revenues when no
such equal voice exists in, e.g., the World Bank, can be explained by noting that the
World Bank administration is controlled according to the amount of capital contribution by the various members while the contribution of revenues into the International
Fund is "intended to compensate the common owners of the mineral resources of the
deep seas by using the 'economic rent' for purposes that the international community
agrees will promote the common welfare."

(Emphasis added.)
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tries for exploitation close to their shores. While not having the Intermediate
Zone concept per se in mind, Mr. Christy has recommended that "the royalties paid to the international authority would be split between that authority and
the adjacent state. The closer to shore, the higher the percentage received by the
state; and the farther from shore, the greater the percentage to the authority.
This would permit U.S. firms to operate throughout the world's oceans under a
single set of rules. Problems of expropriation and inflated royalty rates would be
greatly diminished."' 145 The coastal state would retain the initial prerogative of
refusing to register a particular claim, thereby precluding unwanted foreign
installations near its shores.
Conclusion

The President's Commission has recommended an integrated 146 legal framework
to govern mineral exploitation in the deep seas. The recommendations are
147
specific in order that a critical examination of its proposals could be made.
This Comment has attempted such an examination, in the course of which it
has been shown that the Commission was aware of the major proposals in this
area and has drawn upon them to construct what is essentially a compromise
regime. Although many times a compromise proposal pleases none of the interested parties, the Commission's recommendation has a better chance of acceptance because not many rights have yet vested in the deep sea areas. In order to
maintain this advantage, international negotiation should begin as soon as
possible. The author recognizes that the Commission's recommendations have
not, as yet, been accepted as the position of the U.S. government, 148 but it is
hoped that some decision will be made before events outpace the planning of a
regime to govern those events.
The Commission's recommendations have been formulated to facilitate the
commercial exploitation of the seas. It must be recognized, however, that at
least for the present, military uses predominate over economic uses of the deep
ocean. 149 Where most of the other proposals for deep sea administration have

145. Christy, supra note 109, at 242.
146. "We also should like to stress that our major recommendations are interrelated.
Rejection of any one of these recommendations would raise serious questions in the
minds of the Commission as to the advisability of continuing with the others." CoMMIsSION'S REPORT, supra note 9, at 147.
147. Ibid.
148. In a State Department memorandum circulated on January 14, 1969, the Commission's Report was neither adopted nor rejected. The memorandum concluded:
"[ilt has . . . been agreed with the Executive Branch that at the present time the US
should take no position as to the outer boundary of the continental shelf or the regime
for the area beyond."
149. Cheever, supra note 105, at 639.
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been based on the desire to demilitarize the seabed,150 the Commission has attempted to design a framework without incorporating defense considerations
in its structure. Such an approach eliminates many of the quarrels over the
meaning of words such as "peaceful," "military" and the like which could
delay acceptance of the regime. It has been pointed out by Assistant Secretary
of the Navy Robert Frosch that "[m]ineral resources and arms control do not
necessarily travel hand-in-hand."''1 By recognizing this distinction, the Commission may succeed in providing the first comprehensive regime for the deep
ocean floor that will be acceptable to a majority of nations. The establishment
of a definitive regime joined with the United States proposed "International
Decade of Ocean Exploration"' 152 should help all nations to soon realize the
promise of the ocean:
The time is ripe to extend our efforts seaward. The technology is
under accelerated development. The task is formidable, but the challenge of the ocean frontier will inspire all who probe its secrets.
The ocean can tie the nations of the world together more than it
separates them geographically. The sciences of the ocean are universal.
Now all nations can unite in mobilizing their energies to promote the
of the ocean so that its bounty may serve
peaceful and cooperative use
53
the needs of all mankind.'
Edward 1. Dempsey
150. See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 106, at 225; Proposed Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed, supra note 79, at 10-11; Senate Hearings, supra
note 30, at 6.
151. Frosch, Marine Mineral Resources: National Security and National Jurisdiction, NAVAL WAR COLLEOE REV., October 1968, at 58.
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